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Empirical studies attempting at testing dualism in developing countries 
often rely on an ex-ante definition of the primary and the secondary 
sector. Many times this methodology causes biases in the estimation 
due to sample selection problems. Also, such definitions may be arbi-
trary sometimes. We use twenty seven years of household data in order 
to test for the existence dual labor markets in Argentina. We estimated 
an endogenous switching model with unknown regime without defi-
ning ex-ante sector attachment. We find evidence of dualism for both 
periods analyzed. However, the differences between the two sectors 
have significantly changed over time. Finally, our estimations also 
corroborate the fact that using the usual ex-ante definition of sector 
attachment may not be adequate for testing dualism. 
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Resumen
Los estudios empíricos existentes para testear la presencia de mer-
cados laborales duales en países en desarrollo generalmente utilizan 
una definición ex ante acerca de si los individuos pertenecen al sector 
primario o secundario. Muchas veces, utilizar esta metodología pro-
duce sesgos en la estimación debido a problemas de auto-selección. 
Además, dicha definición de pertenencia a uno u otro sector puede 
resultar arbitraria. En este trabajo, se utilizan veintisiete años de 
datos provenientes de encuestas de hogares para testear la existencia 
de un mercado laboral dual en la Argentina. Se estima un modelo de 
cambio de régimen endógeno sin definir el sector de pertenencia ex 
ante. Los resultados sugieren la existencia de un mercado dual para 
los dos períodos bajo análisis. Sin embargo, las diferencias entre los 
dos sectores han cambiado significativamente a lo largo del tiempo. 
Finalmente, las estimaciones corroboran que el uso de una definición 
ex ante de pertenencia al sector primario/ secundario puede no resultar 
adecuada para comprobar la existencia de mercados duales.
Palabras clave: mercados duales, modelo de cambio de régimen en-
dógeno, países en desarrollo.
Clasificación JEL: J24, J31, J72.
Introduction
The literature on labor market segmentation and dualism claims that 
labor markets can be characterized by the existence of two sectors 
and a rationing mechanism that prevents some workers from entering 
one sector by non economic barriers. One of the sectors is called “pri-
mary sector” in which individuals enjoy higher wages and returns to 
schooling, longer tenure and on the job training. The other is named 




training and tenure are much lower. Moreover, there are some non 
economic barriers that prevent some of the secondary workers from 
obtaining primary jobs.
In this sense, such literature is seen as a departure from classical hu-
man capital theory where individuals in low paid jobs are considered 
low productivity workers unwilling to acquire the necessary skills 
to access better paid jobs. Such individuals may also be unable to 
acquire such skills due to market imperfections, credit constraints, 
etc. The principal policy implication of human capital theory is that 
individuals should have all the tools and incentives available in order 
to acquire more skills.
In contrast, dual market supporters state that high wage jobs in the 
primary sector are rationed, and some groups -women, minorities, 
young workers, etc. - may face non-economic barriers to entry. If labor 
markets behave in such way, then training will not eliminate barriers 
to access to primary sector jobs. In this case, the most direct policy 
implication would be the provision of income maintenance programs 
for groups facing rationing1.
Finally, another assertion of dual market supporters is that dualism fits 
the main features of labor markets in developing countries. Testing 
whether labor markets are segmented or if they behave according to 
human capital theory is important, since the policy implications for 
classical human capital theory and dualism differ.
However, such tests are difficult, since they involve proving the 
existence of two different wage setting mechanisms and barriers to 
the access to primary sector jobs. There are different approaches for 
testing dualism: one based on analysis of job-factor characteristics, a 
second one based on an ex ante definition of sectors and estimation of 
different wage equations and a third one, where the sector attachment 
of the worker is not observed but estimated.
The first two approaches have been used extensively both in developed 
and developing countries. For the case of developing countries, most 
1  In the most recent literature about dualism, there is some scope for training and minimizing 
the extent of the secondary sector, but the main policy implication mentioned above remains 
valid.84
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of the existing work relies on the first two methodologies. When the 
testing method depends on an a priori definition of the worker’s sector, 
the definition of primary and secondary sector adopted is of great im-
portance for two reasons: in terms of policy implications and because 
of the bias in the estimation which may arise as a consequence of using 
a definition which does not match primary and secondary jobs.
The distinction between workers in each sector differs according to 
different authors. For example, for some developing countries, primary 
workers are sometimes defined as the ones working in capital intensive 
sectors while secondary workers are those working in labor intensive 
jobs as agriculture. In others, like some of the biggest Latin American 
countries for example, primary jobs tend to be associated with stable 
employment, bigger firms and the industrial sector. Secondary jobs 
tend to be concentrated in smaller establishments, generally associated 
with the underground economy. The former jobs are sometimes labeled 
as “formal” jobs, while the latter are labeled as “informal”.
However, the fact that more low paid workers are concentrated in spe-
cific sectors of the economy is not enough to justify that all workers 
employed in that sector are informal. For example, while construction 
workers are generally low paid workers in developing countries and 
can be regarded as secondary workers, the claim that all workers in the 
construction sector are secondary workers is difficult to sustain.
Argentina represents an ideal case to test the hypothesis of dualism 
due to three reasons. First, as a developing country and according to 
dualism’s claims, it should fit the dual labor market features. Secondly, 
its labor market has suffered major transformations in the last decade, 
so we can inquire about the change in the structure of labor markets 
and look at what happened to the size of the secondary sector. Finally, 
there are household surveys available for almost three decades with 
information that allows us to identify workers with lower wages as 
well as other individual characteristics which could, in principle, be 
regarded as secondary workers. The survey has information whether 
the worker is paid social security benefits by its employer (social 
security benefits include health benefits, pensions, insurance against 
working hazard, etc.). Enjoying such benefits is highly correlated with 




or not, and in principle, could be used as an indicator for an a priori 
definition of being in the primary sector. Henceforth, we will address 
the workers who enjoy social security benefits as “formal workers” 
and “informal” the ones who do not.
This paper attempts at testing the existence of dualism, i.e.: the exis-
tence of two wage setting mechanisms and evidence of rationing in 
the access to jobs in the primary sector, the evolution of primary and 
secondary sectors over time and finally, whether informal workers can 
be considered secondary workers.
Using micro data for the main urban area of Argentina between 1975 
and 2001, we estimate an endogenous switching model with unknown 
regimes and then address the problem of rationing. Our results suggest 
that there is evidence of dualism for the different subperiods considered 
and that the size of the secondary sector changed over time. Finally 
we show that there exists some degree of correlation between informal 
workers and secondary workers, but not all informal workers can be 
considered secondary workers, which supports the idea that dualism 
should not be tested using an a priori definition of sectors.
It represents a contribution to the existing literature about dualism in 
developing countries, both by addressing the issue of rationing and by cir-
cumventing the problem of using an a priori definition of sector attachment. 
Moreover, it provides some insights useful for policy implications.
The paper is structured as follows: section I presents a literature review, 
section II presents a test for the existence of dual labor markets in 
Argentina. Sections III and IV present the description of the data and 
the estimation procedure respectively. Section V presents the results 
and finally section VI concludes.
I.  Literature review
Literature on dualism and labor market segmentation is vast both in 
empirical and theoretical terms. In what follows we focus on the one 86
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that is most relevant for this paper. We make a summary of the empi-
rical literature, for the US and also for developing countries2. 
We also make some brief mention to theoretical models which generate 
a dual economy and may have interesting testable implications.
Literature on dualism started with the seminal work of Doeringer 
and Piore (1971). The main idea of the authors is the existence of an 
administrative unit, firm or plant called “internal labor market”, whe-
re both price and allocation of labor is dictated by a set of rules and 
procedures which can be distinguished from the ones ruling conven-
tional economic theory. Access to internal labor markets is not always 
available to workers in external labor markets due to the existence of 
rigidities in the rules governing the pricing and allocation of labor 
within them. Such rigidities make internal labor markets to have a 
different dynamic from the one predicted by conventional economic 
theory. According to the authors internal labor markets “can provide a 
more efficient form of market organization than competitive markets 
whenever fixed labor costs and economies of recruitment, screening 
and training are present”. Internal labor markets correspond to what the 
authors called “primary sector” employment, with high wages, stable 
employment and on the job training. In contrast, there are other jobs 
outside internal labor markets called “secondary sector” jobs which 
are characterized by low wages, bad working conditions, and unstable 
employment. One key element of their theory is the fact that rationing 
exists in the primary sector and, in the case of the US, some minorities, 
women and blacks can be segregated.
After the original work on dualism, literature evolved theoretically 
and empirically. As far as theoretical models are concerned, dualism 
was explained by modeling deviations from market clearing which 
could give rise to it. The basic model explaining dualism is an exten-
sion from the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) model of efficiency wages. 
In the Shapiro and Stiglitz model firms pay workers above marginal 
product of labor because monitoring technology is costly. Wages are 
higher than marginal product in order for the firm to elicit work effort 
2  For a complete survey of empirical work on dual labor markets, see Dickens and Lang (1992). 




from their employees. At the market wage level, workers “shirk”. 
The higher penalty that a firm can impose on a worker is firing him, 
the higher the wage, the higher the cost of losing the job will be. If 
market cleared, the cost of losing a job to the worker would be zero 
and he would immediately find another job at the same wage. In their 
efficiency wage model, Shapiro and Stiglitz show that there is invo-
luntary unemployment, since unemployed workers cannot underbid 
employed ones, the employer knows that they would shirk if paid 
below efficiency wage levels.
The modification of the basic efficiency wage model in order to account 
for dualism is done by Bulow and Summers (1986) by extending it to 
a two sector model, one with monitoring costs -sector one or primary 
sector- and another one without them -sector two or secondary. While 
the latter will pay competitive wages, the former one will pay a wage 
above market clearing level, for the same reasons of the efficiency wage 
model. To workers, the value of being in the secondary sector equals the 
value of being unemployed. In this sense, Bulow and Summers do not 
generate involuntary unemployment, but workers in sector two would 
like to be employed in the primary sector but cannot bid down wages. 
In equilibrium, wages in sector 1 are higher than wages in sector two. 
While jobs in sector 1 are rationed, jobs in sector two are not. Moreover, 
if wages are correlated with some observable characteristics of the wor-
kers which are uncorrelated to productivity (women, young workers, 
workers with higher turnover, etc.), equally productive workers can be 
allocated in the primary or secondary sector arbitrarily.
The dual model of Bulow and Summers is then extended by Saint-
Paul (1996), who collects all the theoretical models which explain the 
coexistence of  “good’’ (primary sector) and “bad’’ (secondary sector) 
jobs within the same economy. Saint-Paul adds a firing cost structure to 
the Bulow and Summers model and shows that in the presence of firing 
costs for primary sector workers, the existence of a secondary sector 
provides “flexibility to the economy”. Dualism arises endogenously 
within the firms in response to demand fluctuations.
In terms of empirical work attempting at testing dualism we can 
identify two different kind of studies. While one of them assumes that 
workers in the secondary sector can be identified, the other considers 
they cannot.88
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Initially, most analysis took the first approach, either by analyzing 
job or workers characteristics or by calculating interindustry or inter-
occupation wage differentials. Dickens and Katz (1986) survey the 
existing literature on wage differentials which look at wage premia 
across industries and also provide their own evidence of such diffe-
rential, finding correlation of certain attributes such as low wages and 
bad working conditions. Another set of studies aims at studying the 
existence of different wage setting mechanisms (Osterman (1975), 
Wright (1979) and Heckman and Hotz (1986)). As mentioned above, 
all these studies rely on an ex-ante definition of primary or secondary 
sectors. In general most of the studies based in an ex-ante definition of 
primary and secondary sector generally conclude that there are different 
wage setting mechanisms, some of them could fit the description of 
primary jobs, and some others, the secondary ones. However, none of 
this studies provide a sound proof of dualism claims, since the issue 
of rationing is not present. Two wage setting mechanisms may be 
consistent with classical human capital theory if rationing does not 
exist and individuals are free to move from one sector to another. The 
fact that is more difficult to reconcile with human capital theory is the 
existence of rationing in jobs in the primary sector, i.e. individuals 
who would like to work in the primary sector cannot find jobs in it. 
Finally, an ex-ante definition of sector attachment also presents some 
potential problems we explain next.
The second approach for testing dualism does not rely on an ex ante 
definition of sector attachment. The first work of such kind is Dickens 
and Lang (1985). They state that an ex-ante division of the sample 
brings about two potential problems. First, the problem of sample 
selection, since the choice of occupation is not independent of unmea-
sured characteristics. Second, assuming that all employees within a 
given industry are either in the primary or in the secondary sector can 
also generate biases. For example, while fast food chains in the US 
are associated with secondary employment, it is difficult to argue that 
top managers in such sector are secondary workers. Their research is 
innovative in two senses: first the probability of being in each sector 
is estimated, and second, a test of rationing is conducted.
Dickens and Lang found evidence of segmentation, with a flat wage 
profile for the secondary sector, i.e.: no returns to education or to 




workers in SMSA, married, highly educated and white are less likely 
to work in the secondary sector.
After Dickens and Lang (1985) developed its testing methodology, 
this methodology has been partially applied to some other countries, 
but the issue of rationing is often neglected.
The issue of rationing is important, since one of the striking facts about 
the so called confrontation between classical human capital theory and 
segmentation is that it implies that when markets do not clear the access 
to some specific sectors is subject to non price rationing. Yet it is striking 
that most of the test trying to address the presence of segmentation do 
not address the rationing issue. Job rationing in the primary sector jobs 
mean that there are individuals queuing for such jobs.
The existence of two wage setting mechanisms without knowing sector 
attachment is explored later for the case of Chile by Basch and Paredes 
(1996). One of the main problems in their analysis is that it does not 
include any test of rationing and while sector attachment is estimated 
it is assumed to be uncorrelated with wage setting mechanisms, which 
may induce biases, since unobserved heterogeneity affecting wage 
equations in either one or the other sector are probably correlated with 
the probability of being in such sector.
Huguet Roig (1999) addressed the segmentation issue for Spain, by 
estimating an endogenous switching model with unknown regime. She 
finds evidence of two wage setting mechanisms for the case of Spain, 
but she makes no reference to the existence of rationing. She also 
provides an accurate account of most of the recent empirical studies 
trying to test dualism.
For the specific case of Argentina, Pratap and Quintin (2003), use 
Household data for Argentina from 1993-1995 in order to evaluate 
semi-parametrically the hypothesis that informal workers should ex-
pect higher wages in the formal sector. In order to account for some 
of the problems which may be present in parametric estimation -such 
as sample selection or model specification- they estimate a matching 
estimator and then a difference in difference estimator. They rely on 
an ex ante definition of sectors, matching formal workers to workers in 90
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the primary sector and informal workers to secondary ones.3. They find 
negative wage premium for the formal (after controlling for personal 
characteristics) and cannot reject the hypothesis of competitive mar-
kets. However, such wage premium is not directly related to dualism 
but more to the problem of social security valuation. Finally, they do 
not address whether there is any barrier to mobility between sectors 
or the existence of rationing.
II. A formal test for dualism in Argentina
A.  Brief characterization of Labor Markets in Argentina
Argentina labor markets suffered major transformations during the 
last decade. Such transformations were the consequence of profound 
changes in its economy since 1991, when a stabilization plan together 
with a huge effort to reform and modernize the state were introduced. 
The country had a long history of macroeconomic instability with 
high inflation (including two hyperinflation episodes in the late 80’s), 
huge budget deficits, very rigid regulations in the labor markets4, high 
real wage volatility, etc.5 However, unemployment was low due to the 
fact that low wage employment in the public sector was an important 
proportion of total employment, accounting for almost 30% of total 
employment in some regions.
In 1991 a major stabilization plan was introduced, establishing a currency 
board which pegged the currency to the US dollar. This stabilization 
plan was followed by trade liberalization, an ambitious privatization 
program and privatization of the Social Security System. The results were 
impressive in terms of inflation as it can be observed in Figure 1. Also, 
the program showed initial success in terms of GDP growth. However, 
labor markets started showing new features that had been unknown in 
3  The same definition of formal and informal workers mentioned in the introduction applies 
here.
4  Taxes on labor amount 30% of wages, firing cost are very high and accidents in the labor 
place are costly to the employer because they can be taken to civil courts, where the amount 
of the compensation has no monetary limit.




the country. One of them was a sharp increase in unemployment together 
with an increase in labor informality, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. We 
can divide our 1975-2001 data sample in two clear different periods ac-
cording to the evolution of labor markets. One with low unemployment 
and low informality which lasts until 1991, and a second one of high 
unemployment and informality starting in 1992.
Figure 1.  Inflation Rate (CPI change).
Source: INDEC.
Figure 2.  Unemployment Level.
Source: INDEC-PHS.92
Are Secondary Workers Informal Workers? 
Evidence for Argentina
Maria Laura Alzua
Figure 3.  Informality rates.
Source: INDEC-PHS.
B.  Hypothesis
We want to test two different things:
 
•  the hypothesis that labor markets behave differently in 1975-1991 
and from 1992 afterwards, more specifically, they behave as com-
petitive markets in the first period and start fitting dual market 
claims in the second period.
•  whether informal workers, as defined for Argentina, can be consi-
dered secondary workers. 
In order to test our first hypothesis, we must show the existence of two 
different wage setting mechanisms, or two wage equations, one for 
the primary sector with higher returns to schooling, experience and 
tenure and one for the secondary sector, with lower (or even statisti-
cally insignificant) returns to education and experience. Secondly, we 
have to conduct a rationing test. Lastly, we must measure the degree of 




III.   Dataset
We used the Permanent Household Survey (PHS) conducted by the 
National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC) for the period 
1975-2001. For all the years except for the 1975-1980 period there are 
two surveys (May-October) per year. Our sample is restricted to the 
City of Buenos Aires and Greater Buenos Aires area (GBA), since this 
is the only area where data is available since 1975. The area considered 
is the biggest Argentine urban area, comprising 34% of population 
and generating 60% of total income.
The sample is a cross-section until 1994 and a rotating panel afterwards. 
Working with such a long data span presents both advantages and 
drawbacks. The main one is the tradeoff between the number of years 
available to test our model and the quality of data available for each 
year. On one hand, it allows us to test the model we estimate over a 
long period of time, looking at trends and changes in the different 
parameters. On the other hand, the quality of the information is rela-
tively poor before 1994, specially since we do not have information 
that would be useful in our estimation. For example, information for 
social security benefits (which allows us to split our sample between 
formal and informal workers) is only available for salaried workers 
and not for self employed individuals. Moreover, labor income for the 
self employed is very badly recorded as well as the number of hours 
worked. Finally, information about the county where individuals live, 
which can be correlated to the kind of job they hold, is only available 
after 1994. To sum up, the only variables that are available throughout 
the whole sample are: labor income for the “main occupation” (more 
than 15 hours per week), hours worked, years of education, age, social 
security benefits and tenure in the occupation6.
In order to maximize the amount of information available we res-
tricted the sample to male salaried workers employed in the private 
sector, between the ages of 15 and 65. Also, we just consider the 
workers’ primary occupation, for people working between 15 and 
80 hours per week. The descriptive statistics of the sample appear 
in Tables 1 and 2.
6  This last information refers to the time they have been working in the same occupation.94
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Table 1.  Description of Variables.
  Sample size   Mean   SD    Sample size   Mean   SD
1975 1982
married 4244 0.79 0.40 married 1668 0.80 0.39
school 4086 7.63 3.70 school 1646 8.56 3.79
experience 4086 21.9 13.20 experience 1646 23.1 1.35
tenure 4230 6.17 2.14 tenure 1655 6.24 2.10
1976 1983
married 2089 0.80 0.39 married 1180 0.80 0.39
school 2012 7.60 3.80 school 1169 8.80 3.84
experience 2012 22.5 1.30 experience 1169 22.9 1.35
tenure 2074 6.18 2.17 tenure 1173 6.26 2.10
1977 1984
married 2016 0.08 0.41 married 1284 0.08 0.39
school 1931 4.65 3.68 school 1269 0.89 3.81
experience 1931 22.4 1.33 experience 1269 22.1 1.35
tenure 2007 6.08 2.22 tenure 1283 0.63 2.10
1978 1986
married 1953 0.79 0.41 married 2273 0.75 0.43
school 1894 7.86 3.69 school 2248 9.21 4.02
experience 1894 22.8 1.36 experience 2248 21.7 0.14
tenure 1939 6.03 2.23 tenure 2272 8.20 0.93
1981 1988
married 1805 0.79 0.40 married 2584 0.74 0.44
school 1775 8.61 3.82 school 2546 9.32 3.79
experience 1775 22.7 1.36 experience 2546 21.2 1.39
tenure 1797 6.26 2.14 tenure 2574 8.38 0.97
1992 1997
married 4454 0.73 0.45 married 4387 0.72 0.45
school 4425 9.94 3.86 school 4375 10.65 0.00
experience 4425 20.5 0.14 experience 4375 19.8 1.38
tenure 4400 8.11 0.09 tenure 4381 7.07 0.87
1993 1998
married 4636 0.72 0.45 married 4508 0.73 0.45
school 4611 10.14 3.95 school 4489 10.67 4.02
experience 4611 20.0 1.37 experience 4489 19.9 1.36
tenure 4517 7.81 0.92 tenure 4502 7.03 0.87
1994 1999
married 4550 0.73 0.44 married 4377 0.73 0.45
school 4531 10.21 3.93 school 4362 10.74 4.02
experience 4531 20.0 1.36 experience 4362 20.1 1.35




Table 2.  Description of Variables (continued).
  Sample size   Mean   SD    Sample size   Mean   SD
1995 2000
married 4260 0.73 0.44 married 4279 0.73 0.44
school 4236 10.43 4.06 school 4266 10.89 0.40
experience 4236 20.0 1.35 experience 4266 20.1 1.34
tenure 4088 7.82 0.90 tenure 4269 7.24 0.87
1996 2001
married 4240 0.72 0.45 married 4033 0.73 0.44
school 4218 10.54 4.07 school 4016 11.04 4.06
experience 4218 20.0 1.36 experience 4016 20.0 1.34
tenure 4119 7.33 0.86 tenure 4026 7.47 0.87
Source: Author’s calculations based on PHS - INDEC.
IV.   Estimation
A.  Endogenous switching model with unknown regime
We will estimate the following system of equations which comprises 
two wage equations, one for the primary sector (p) and other for the 
secondary sector (s) and a third equation, the switching (w) equation 
which measures the probability of being in the primary sector.
  WX u ip i
'
pi p = b +   (1)
 
  WX u is i
'
si s = b +   (2)
  DX u i
'















   (1) 
 
where the Wij are individuals log of hourly wages for j = p,s,  Xi
' are 
are non stochastic regressors, bj are coefficients for j = p,s,w and uj i
'   
are normally distributed error terms. Equation (1) corresponds to the 
wage equation if the individual is in the primary sector, equation (2) 
is the wage if the individual is in the secondary sector and (3) is the 
switching equation. D is a latent variable which measures the tendency 
to be in the primary sector. We do not observe D. However, if  D ≥ 0 , 
the individual wage is determined by equation (1), otherwise is deter-96
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mined by (2). This means that if uX iw i
'
w > − b  the individual’s wage is 
determined by equation (1) while if uX iw i
'
w ≤− b  the individual’s wage 
is determined by (2). D is not observed, it has to be estimated, since 
we do not use an a priori definition of sector attachment.
The variance covariance matrix for this system is:






















2  has been normalized to one7.
The likelihood function of this problem is given by:
 
Pr uX Xu fu Pr uXXu fu iw i
'
wi ip ip iw i
'
wi is is (> ,)() (, )( ) −⋅ +≤ −⋅ bb ||   (6)
f( ) is the density function of uip and uis.






































































where () ⋅ and  () ⋅  are, respectively, the distribution function and 
the density of a standard normal, rpw and rsw  are the correlation co-
efficients between (up, uw) and (us, uw). We normalized  w
2 to one, as 
mentioned above8.
7  In this model we cannot identify simultaneously the coefficients of the switching equation 
and its error variance. For a discussion on this issue see Nelson and Maddala (1975).




We can estimate (, ,, ) , b r jj w Σ , j = p, s by maximum likelihood using 
search algorithms.
The variables used as regressors in the three equations were: school-
ing level, tenure, dummy for married, potential experience (calculated 
as age minus years of schooling minus six), experience squared and 
year dummies. As mentioned before, the different estimations were 
conducted without assuming any ex-ante sector attachment -the 
separation in the switching regime was unknown- and so D has to be 
estimated.
We performed different sets of estimations: standard Mincer equa-
tions using OLS for every year of the sample, pooling the data into 
two periods and then one estimation for the whole sample. Then we 
estimated a model of endogenous switching with unknown regime as 
in Maddala and Nelson (1975)9. Unfortunately, we did not achieve 
convergence in the year by year estimation. We estimated the results 
for the whole sample and then for the different sub periods. We per-
formed estimations restricting the schooling coefficients to remain 
constant (restricted model) within each period and allowing then to 
vary year by year (unrestricted model). We then conducted rationing 
test for each period.
V.  Results
Tables 3 and 4 present the results for the estimation of the OLS and 
the unrestricted switching model for the dual market hypothesis for the 
first and the second period respectively. For the first period considered 
(Table 3) the returns to schooling for the OLS estimation are 6% for 
the first two years and then they increase afterwards, averaging 9%. 
Being married and tenure have a positive effect on wages and poten-
tial experience and experience squared have the usual signs observed 
in standard Mincer equations. Holding all the other factors constant 
in the sample means, married individuals earn 6% more and an extra 
year of tenure increases wages by 2%.
9  A detailed explanation of the estimation procedure can be seen in the appendix.98
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 Switching model 
 Secondary Sector 
Switching 
 Prob (being in PS) 
 Primary Sector 
 
 married   0.152   0.201   0.111   0.062 
 (12.54)**   (4.26)**   (6.47)**   (0.63) 
tenure   0.021   0.008   0.026   0.049 
 (20.89)**   (2.04)*   (9.01)**   (1.51) 
school   0.057   0.056   0.034   0.231 
 (20.95)**   (2.27)*   (5.36)**   (9.33)** 
y76school   0.009   -0.035   -0.002   -0.035 
 (2.07)*   (1.47)   (0.17)   (0.69) 
y77school   0.02   -0.032   -0.009   0.009 
 (4.28)**   (1.30)   (0.89)   (0.21) 
y78school   0.035   -0.01   -0.004   -0.007 
 (7.38)**   (0.40)   (0.37)   (0.15) 
y80school   0.035   -0.014   -0.005   0.004 
 (9.06)**   (0.65)   (0.53)   (0.11) 
y81school   0.039   0.003   0.011   -0.077 
 (7.91)**   (0.12)   (1.09)   (2.03)* 
y82school   0.043   0.013   -0.008   0.005 
 (8.52)**   (0.56)   (0.71)   (0.13) 
y83school   0.041   0.014   0.013   -0.049 
 (7.06)**   (0.51)   (1.24)   (1.13) 
y84school   0.031   -0.033   -0.005   0.006 
 (5.73)**   (0.99)   (0.49)   (0.12) 
y85school   0.032   0.00   0.005   -0.049 
 (7.37)**   (0.01)   (0.54)   (1.24) 
y86school   0.035   0.016   0.017   0.052 
 (8.23)**   (0.74)   (2.06)*   (0.74) 
y88school   0.046   0.024   0.007   0.061 
 (10.86)**   (1.17)   (0.64)   (0.90) 
experience   0.032   0.027   0.024   0.015 
 (24.43)**   (5.34)**   (11.32)**   (1.54) 
experience2   -0.001   -0.001   0.00   0.00 
 (20.73)**   (4.93)**   (11.79)**   (1.37) 
Constant   1.675   2.275   1.961   (3.87) 
 (65.28)**   (4.84)**   (39.76)**   (10.61)** 
Cov with     -0.533   -0.222   (a) 
switching eq         
   (3.43)**   (5.95)**   
Log likelihood   -9896160.1     -9104295.2   
Observations   18223     18163   
t statistics in parentheses, dependent variable is log hourly wage
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
(a) normalized to 1




Table 4.  Estimation Results for 1990s.
 
 OLS   Primary Sector
 Switching model 
 Secondary Sector 
 Switching 
 Prob (being in PS) 
married   0.128   0.150   0.140   0.102 
 (13.74)**   (9.79)**   (5.03)**   (2.15)* 
tenure   0.015   0.011   0.022   0.001 
 (31.98)**   (9.94)**   (5.09)**   (0.15) 
school   0.086   0.131   0.033   0.077 
 (31.04)**   (22.60)**   (3.51)**   (3.65)** 
y93school   -0.002   0.002   0.003   0.005 
 (0.46)   (0.35)   (0.21)   (0.19) 
y94school   0.002   0.005   0.024   0.017 
 (0.52)   (0.66)   (2.02)*   (0.68) 
y95school   0.01   0.008   0.022   0.028 
 (2.67)**   (1.21)   (1.81)   (1.16) 
y96school   0.008   0.014   0.024   0.042 
 (2.20)*   (1.98)*   (2.11)*   (1.77) 
y97school   0.011   0.026   0.029   0.05 
 (2.98)**   (3.78)**   (2.53)*   (2.03)* 
y98school   0.017   0.025   0.040   0.049 
 (4.73)**   (3.65)**   (3.33)**   (1.65) 
y99school   0.011   0.018   0.029   0.040 
 (2.99)**   (2.44)*   (2.55)*   (1.51) 
y100school   0.02   0.032   0.040   0.085 
 (5.24)**   (4.51)**   (3.24)**   (3.06)** 
y101school   0.022   0.029   0.049   0.085 
 (5.91)**   (3.68)**   (4.15)**   (1.77) 
experience   0.025   0.028   0.015   0.007 
 (26.33)**   (16.38)**   (4.17)**   (1.04) 
experience2   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
 (20.50)**   (9.96)**   (5.26)**   (0.70) 
Constant   1.088   0.392   1.241   -0.434 
 (35.78)**   (4.70)**   (19.09)**   (2.39)* 
Cov with     0.550   0.762   (a) 
switching eq         
   (51.41)**   (16.97)**   
Log likelihood   -24203742     -22470939   
Observations   29074     29074   
t statistics in parentheses, dependent variable is log hourly wage
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
(a) normalized to 1
Year Dummies were included in the estimation
In terms of the switching model, we present the results for the unrestric-
ted version. The restricted estimation, which states that the schooling 100
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coefficient is constant across years is rejected. (Twice the difference 
between the constrained and the unconstrained model is 568,873.8, 
which rejects the hypothesis of constant schooling coefficient across 
the years.) For the sample average, individuals in the secondary sector 
earn 19% less than their primary peers10.
The schooling coefficient for the primary sector is higher for some 
years with respect to that of the secondary sector. In 1975, returns to 
schooling are 5.6% and 3.4% in the primary and secondary sector 
respectively. Over the period, returns to education increase in the 
primary sector, reaching 8% in the last year of the period. In the 
secondary sector, returns also increase, but less than in the primary 
sector (4.1% in 1988). An extra year of education with respect to the 
sample mean raises wages by 5% in the primary sector and 3% in the 
secondary sector.
An extra year of tenure increases wages by 1% and 2.6% in the pri-
mary and in the secondary sector respectively. Wages corresponding 
to married individuals are 20% higher in the primary sector. Also, 
being married also raises wages more in the primary sector: a married 
individual earns 19% more in the primary sector and just 12% in the 
secondary sector. The coefficients of the switching equation -which 
indicates the probability of being in the primary sector- indicate that 
being married, having a longer job tenure, education and experience 
increase the probability of being in the primary sector.
For the first period considered we reject the null of only one wage 
setting mechanism in favor of the two wage setting mechanisms by 
conducting a likelihood ratio test.
When we look at the OLS estimation for the second period (Table 4), 
returns to schooling increased with respect to the OLS estimation for 
the previous period. Also, after 1994 returns to education increase, 
peaking 10.8% in 2001. All the rest of the coefficients have the con-
ventional signs.
10  All the calculations are for the means of 1975 and 1992 in each period, but the magnitude 




Married individuals have wages 5% higher than non-married indivi-
duals. Besides, an extra year of tenure increases wages by only 1%.
Again, we focus our comments on the unrestricted version of the 
switching model for the dual market, since a likelihood ratio test 
also rejected the hypothesis of constant coefficients for schooling. 
The primary sector shows higher returns to education with respect to 
both the OLS estimation and the secondary sector in the switching 
model. Returns for 1992 are 13%. In the secondary sector, returns to 
schooling are lower (3.3%). While by the end of the period, returns 
in the primary sector are 16%, they are 8.2% in the secondary one. 
While the latter are just half of the value for the primary sector they 
doubled with respect to the ones observed in the beginning of the pe-
riod. An extra year of education with respect to the sample mean raises 
wages by 5.3% in the primary sector and only 0.7% in the secondary 
sector. While - conditional on being in one sector- wages are higher 
for married individuals, the differential between married individuals 
from switching from the secondary to the primary sector is 14%. For 
unmarried individuals this differential is similar (13%). Average wages 
are 14% higher in the primary sector.
As far is the switching equation is concerned, schooling, tenure and be-
ing married increase the probability of being in the primary sector.
For the second period, our estimations also support the existence of 
two different wage setting mechanisms, as evidenced by a likelihood 
ratio test.
The endogenous switching models estimated confirm the hypothesis of 
two wage setting mechanisms for each period considered. The differen-
ces between the returns to schooling for each sector are significantly 
higher for the second period than for the first one. However, while in 
the second period the wage differential between the primary and the 
secondary sector is always positive, for the second period is negative 
for lower level of schooling (whenever years of schooling is lower than 
7 years (which in Argentina corresponds to elementary education).
As far as the switching equation for both periods, the signs or the esti-
mated coefficients are the same, but its magnitude cannot be compared 102
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between periods because of the normalization we imposed. We move 
on to explore if there is evidence of rationing.
A.  Rationing tests
The second claim of dual market theory is that there is rationing to 
primary sector jobs, a fact which cannot be accounted for using stan-
dard human capital theory. In order to test the existence of rationing 
or non economic barriers to primary jobs, we have to define first a 
rule for allocating workers in the primary or secondary sector when 
there is no rationing.
In this section, we follow closely Dickens and Lang (1985). They 
perform a rationing test for the US. As they do, we assume that experi-
ence in one sector raises wages in such sector, more than it does in the 
other one. Workers behave as utility maximizers over their lifetime. 
With perfect information about job characteristics and constant non-
pecuniary tastes for jobs, one individual should choose one sector and 
remain there his entire working life.
In the absence of rationing, a worker chooses primary sector if (as-
suming that non pecuniary aspects of employment do not change over 
time) NPVip > NPVis, i.e. the net present value of working in the primary 
sector exceeds a compensating differential k.
We can write the probability that a worker is on the primary sector as:
 
  PP rl nN PV ln NPVk ip is =[ () () >] −   (8)
where the subscripts p and s are primary and secondary sector respec-
tively. We approximate ln(NPVij) by Wij. We write again our two wage 
equations (one for each sector):
  WX u ip i
'
pi p = b +   (9)
 
  WX u is i
'
pi s = b +   (10)
where Wij are log of hourly wages in each sector, Xi is a vector of in-
dividual characteristics already used and uij are normally distributed 




  Pr Xu uu k i
'
pswi pi si w
' {( )> } bbb −+ +−+−   (11)
k
' can be considered a constant plus a normally distributed error term 
if we assume that individuals’ tastes with respect to non-pecuniary 
aspects of employment do not vary with observable characteristics.
We may test that people choose their sector of employment to maxi-
mize their utility. We estimate an equation for sector membership by 
testing restrictions on coefficients on the switching equation and test 






ip is iw () bbb −+ ++ −+  (12)
We test if the coefficients for bw corresponding to schooling is equal 
to zero and to the difference between the corresponding coefficients 
in the primary and secondary wage equations. Preferences for non 
pecuniary aspects of primary sector employment may be related to 
some workers characteristics, for example, married or older male 
workers may have a greater taste for primary employment, while fe-
males and young workers may prefer to enter the secondary sector11, it 
may be the case that some coefficients in the switching regression are 
different from zero even in the absence of rationdifing. If the market 
is not rationed and there are some non-pecuniary aspects related to 
taste for primary sector employment, then the bw should equal bp - 
bs. We are imposing constraints in all the schooling coefficients: 12 
constraints for the first period and 10 for the second period, but we 
relax the normalization of w
2 =1. The degrees of freedom are 11 and 
9 respectively for each period.
Using likelihood ratio tests, both hypothesis are rejected (Twice the 
difference between the log likelihood between the constrained and 
the unconstrained model is 508.003,6 and 569.896 for each period 
11  Data limitation prevent us from explaining segmentation by other factors than wages and 
education. It would be ideal to have more regressors in the switching equation to allow for 
some other factors accounting for tendency or preferences to be in the secondary sector 
(gender, race, location, etc). However, we use only city data of the greater metropolitan 
district, in order to mitigate some of these omissions. Morever, factors like race are not a 
significant characteristic to add as a covariate for the specific data under analysis, since the 
population in the sample is taken from a very homogeneous population group.104
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respectively when we test the restrictions that the coefficients of the 
switching equation are zero and 894.021,8 and 965.874 when we test 
whether the difference between the coefficients of the primary and 
secondary sector equals the coefficients of the switching equation), 
rejecting the our null hypothesis12.
We have different explanations for our results. For the first period, the 
wage differential between the primary and the secondary is always 
positive regardless the educational level of the individuals. Our results 
suggest that the fraction of workers in the primary sector rises with 
education more rapidly than expected. This implies that either workers 
with low education are rationed or highly educated workers are more 
averse to secondary employment.
For the second period, our results of the previous section indicated 
that the wage differential between the primary and secondary sector 
is negative for individuals with less than seven years of schooling, 
which in Argentina corresponds to incomplete elementary education. 
This latter fact makes the rationing argument for low educated people 
less compelling, since wages in the secondary sector are higher than 
in the primary one for less educated people. In order to venture some 
explanation for our results, we will calculate the size of the secondary 
sector and check which is the composition of such sector.
B.  Informal workers vs. secondary workers
If the hypothesis of dual labor model is accepted for both periods, the 
model can be used to test the composition of the secondary sector. 
We can also see to what extent can secondary workers be labeled as 
informal workers. Applying Bayes’ theorem, we can calculate the 
probability that a worker i is in the primary sector as: 
 
Pr uX Xu
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12  Some of the parameters under the null for a test of a single vs. dual markets are not identi-




which gives us the probability that a worker is in the primary sector 
conditional on the observed wages and personal characteristics. The 
percentage of workers is calculated by computing the average of 
primary sector attachment for all workers. Using this formula we 
can calculate the ex-post probability of being in the secondary sector 
conditional on different individual characteristics and observed wages 
and also, the percentage of secondary workers for a given category.
Tables 5 and 6 allow us to calculate such values for each sector for 
the first and the second period respectively.
Table 5.  Composition of Sample and Secondary Sector-70’s and 80’s.
 
 % in the sample 
 in category 
 % secondary workers 
 in category 
 % of workers in 
each category
 in secondary sector
Married   78.3   71.6   33.8
Schooling       
Incomplete primary   22.0   43.0   83.1
Primary   37.3   42.0   47.8
Incomplete highschool   19.7   10.4   22.4
Complete highschool   10.8   2.5   9.8
Incomplete college   6.2   1.5   10.5
College and more   4.1   0.7   6.9
Formal Workers   82.9   55.2   41.0
Age       
under 25   17.6   25.0   59.1
25-29   12.4   14.1   47.3
30-39   25.4   25.0   27.5
40-49   22.5   19.2   13.3
50-59   18.1   13.5   31.0
60 and over   4.1   3.0   31.0
Tenure       
less than a year   3.3   5.0   63.3
1 to 5   35.6   44.1   51.7
6 to 10   56.2   85.2   36.5
more than 10   4.9   1.7   13.2
Total       35.0106
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Table 6.  Composition of Sample and Secondary Sector-90’s. 
   % in the 
sample 
 in category 
 % secondary 
workers 
 in category 
 % of workers in 
each category
 in secondary sector
Married   72.6   74.9   73.2
Schooling       
Incomplete highschool and less   59.9   2.4   96.8
Complete highschool   17.9   24.7   58.7
Incomplete college   11.4   37.3   2.3
College and more   10.8   35.6   0.9
Formal Workers   69.1   44.7   32.8
Age       
under 25   18.9   11.0   82.6
25-29   13.4   12.1   73.1
30-39   24.6   23.1   81.9
40-49   22.7   28.2   86.2
50-59   15.8   19.6   63.1
60 and over   4.7   6.1   61.4
Tenure       
less than a year   19.9   12.5   81.0
1 to 5   39.4   38.5   70.5
6 to 10   16.2   18.3   65.9
more than 10   24.6   30.6   64.1
Total       72.3
 
According to our calculations, 35% and 72% of male workers are in 
the secondary sector in each period13.
The first remarkable fact is that the percentage of secondary workers 
predicted by the model is different from the number of informal wor-
kers observed in the sample for both periods considered.
Also, some other interesting facts are observed: the percentage of 
married workers in the secondary sector is lower than the percentage 
of married workers in the whole sample. Moreover, the proportion of 
secondary workers who are married is much lower than the percen-
tage of married workers in the sample for both periods considered. 




Secondary workers tend to have less education than the proportion of 
workers in the complete sample, and most of the secondary workers 
have incomplete high-school or less years of education. The same 
applies for ages of workers. The proportion of young workers in the 
secondary sector is higher than for the whole sample.
One interesting aspect to mention is that of formal workers and the 
secondary sector: the proportion of formal workers among secondary 
workers is lower than for the whole sample in both periods (41% 
vs. 83% for the first period and 32% vs. 70% for the second period). 
Additionally, the proportion of secondary workers who are formal is 
lower, but it is positive and far from negligible. This gives us some 
idea of why it may not appropriate to resort to an ex-ante definition of 
sector attachment when we are interested in testing for the existence 
dualism.
In this sense, the information available in Argentina about formality of 
the workers could be used in principle as an ex-ante definition of sector 
attachment. In general, informal workers are paid lower wages14, and 
have higher rotation in their jobs. The indicator of formality could be 
used to split the sample and test for the presence of dual labor markets 
in the Argentine economy by means of an ex-ante definition of sectors 
and then compare both models.
However, we would like to use the information available about infor-
mality in order to see to which degree secondary workers are informal 
workers.
As we observed before in tables 5 and 6, the proportion of formal 
workers is lower in the secondary sector with respect to the percentage 
of formal workers in the sample for each period considered. Moreover 
the proportion of formal workers as a proportion of secondary workers 
is much lower. This gives an idea that while there is less formality in 
secondary jobs, its value is not zero. Based on the predictions of the 
probabilities calculated using , using an ex-ante definition of formal-
informal workers to study market dualism is not entirely correct.
14  Most studies show that after controlling from selection and individual characteristic the 
compensating differential between informal and formal workers for Argentina is negative. 
See Brassiolo, Mondino and Ruffo (2003).108
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In order to explore this relationship further we estimate again the same 
endogenous switching model with unknown separation regime for 
both periods with the only difference that an indicator for formality in 
both wage equations and in the switching equation as well was added. 
Results can be observed in tables 7 and 8.
Table 7.  Estimation Results for the 1970s and 1980s.
 Primary Sector 
 Switching model 
 Secondary Sector  
Switching 
 Prob (being in PS) 
married   0.214   0.116   0.135 
 (8.07)**   (4.50)**   (1.84) 
formal   0.142   0.255   0.378 
 (3.91)**   (8.35)**   (2.79)** 
tenure   0.017   0.051   0.045 
 (10.89)**   (8.61)**   (5.53)** 
school   0.139   0.046   0.138 
 (33.54)**   (13.13)**   (11.89)** 
experience   0.034   0.017   0.013 
 (13.04)**   (4.65)**   (1.31) 
experience2   0.000   0.000   0.000 
 (8.55)**   (4.63)**   (0.64) 
Constant   0.402   1.774   -2.233 
 (4.66)**   (27.64)**   (9.56)** 
Cov with   0.583   0.530   (a) 
switching eq   (43.99)**   (15.40)**   
Log likelihood   -8186782     
Observations   16846     
t statistics in parentheses, dependent variable is log hourly wage
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
(a) normalized to 1
Year Dummies were included in the estimation
The indicator of formality is positive and significant in both wage 
equations and also affects positively the probability of being in the 
primary sector. The effect of formality on wages in the secondary 
sector is higher than in the primary sector.
However, this estimation encounters the problem of endogeneity of 
formality, since it is hard to argue that the decision of working in the 




Table 8.  Estimation Results for the 1990s.
 
Primary Sector  
 Switching model 
 Secondary Sector  
Switching 
 Prob (being in PS) 
married   0.151   0.127   0.136 
 (9.36)**   (6.31)**   (2.95)** 
formal   0.124   0.333   0.544 
 (7.24)**   (15.23)**   (10.11)** 
tenure   0.01   0.022   0.006 
 (8.86)**   (7.22)**   (1.18) 
school   0.156   0.059   0.14 
 (53.81)**   (21.84)**   (15.74)** 
experience   0.028   0.015   0.01 
 (15.65)**   (6.82)**   (1.67) 
experience2   0.00   0.00   0.00 
 (8.82)**   (7.34)**   (1.13) 
Constant   -0.025   1.616   -1.631 
 (0.44)   (35.33)**   (14.50)** 
Cov with   0.544   0.574   (a) 
switching eq   (44.81)**   (25.93)**   
Log likelihood     -21200716   
Observations   28679     
t statistics in parentheses, dependent variable is log hourly wage
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
(a) normalized to 1
Year Dummies were included in the estimation
In order to overcome such problem we attempted a joint estimation 
of a modified switching model, trying to obtain the probabilities of 
being formal/informal conditioned on being in the primary or secon-
dary sector15. Unfortunately, we did not achieve convergence of the 
the algorithms used to estimate this models.
15  We attempted the estimation of the following likelihood function: 
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  where pf and pi are the probabilities of being formal and informal respectively, and we as-
sumed them constant.110
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VI.   Conclusions
The paper had two main objectives. First, to test dual labor market 
claims for two different historical periods in Argentina between 1970 
and 1990 and between 1991 and 2000 and then to check if informal 
workers, defined as workers who do not receive social security benefits, 
can be considered secondary workers for the same periods or, in other 
words if it was appropriate to test dualism using an a priori definition 
of sector attachment.
For the first purpose, we tested two different things: first, whether two 
wage equations, one for the primary sector and other for the secondary 
sector fit the data better than one and, secondly, whether primary sector 
jobs are rationed. We started by estimating an endogenous switching 
model with an unknown separation regime for each period. Results 
provide evidence of segmentation in both periods, against our priors 
of perfect competition in labor markets for the first period. These 
results are achieved without resorting to an ex-ante definition of sec-
tor attachment for conducting the estimations. This proves the first 
claim of dual labor market theory. As regards the issue of rationing, 
we are able to reject the hypothesis of free choice for the schooling 
coefficient. Unfortunately, the fact that we are restricting the sample 
to males only does not allow us to test women segregation or any 
other issues related to rationing. However, for individuals with less 
than elementary schooling, wages in the secondary sector are higher 
than in the primary sector for the second period, so rationing may be 
affecting people with intermediate levels of education.
In order to see to what extent informal workers in Argentina can be 
regarded as secondary workers, we observed that while the proportion 
of formal workers in the secondary sector and the number of formal 
workers in it are smaller than in the sample, this number is not zero, 
so as a first approximation to the issue of using an ex-ante definition of 
sector we can conclude that such classification may not be adequate.
In terms of exploring the possible ways of causation between infor-
mality and secondary jobs, we did not obtain any conclusive answer, 
since our estimations faced the problem of endogeneity of the indicator 
for formality. We tried an estimation which took care of this problem 




The paper represents a contribution to the labor market literature in 
developing countries in two different areas. First, it is the first study 
of segmentation available for developing countries using such a long 
data span, since most of existing studies are restricted to cross sectional 
data for some specific years, which can be problematic when we are 
working with countries subject to large demand volatility, as it may be 
the case with some developing countries. Secondly, it provides some 
evidence of segmentation that does not rely on an ex-ante definition of 
primary and secondary jobs and further supports the evidence that such 
divisions may be inappropriate, at least for the case of Argentina.
In terms of policy implications, it provides some interesting insights, 
since the model predicts the existence of formal and informal workers 
both in the primary and secondary sector. However, formal and in-
formal workers earn less in the secondary sector, which may support 
the idea that it may be more important to look at the wage levels and 
provide income support for low income individuals than to focus on 
labor informality.
On the possible extensions of this work, the issue of rationing should 
be further explored for both the literature about dualism, particularly 
differentiating preferences for secondary employment from rationing. 
In the specific case of Argentina, it is also worth exploring the effects 
of labor demand volatility, inflation and labor market rigidities and 
their interaction with the informal and secondary sector.
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We conducted the estimation of the endogenous switching model with 
unknown regime using standard Maximum Likelihood Search algori-
thms. The non linearity of the system and the fact that the log likelihood 
function is not globally concave made convergence difficult. While it 
would have been ideal to conduct year by year estimation of the switching 
model, convergence was not achieved for most of the years. For that 
reason, results are not presented, even for the few years that converged. 
Instead an estimation pooling the data for each period was conducted. We 
added year dummies and also allowed the schooling coefficient to vary 
over time. We present the results pooling the data for each period with 
the year dummies and allowing the school coefficient to vary each year. 
We also estimated a restricted version where the schooling coefficient 
was forced to be constant across years within each period. A likelihood 
ratio rejects the null that the restrictions are valid.
Since the function is not globally concave, it had several local maxima. 
That is why we estimated it using different algorithms and trying different 
starting values. Given the difficulties that arose in the estimation, we 
tried different algorithms to check if results were robust to the change 
in them. The algorithms used in the Maximum Likelihood estimation 
were Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman (1974) and Newton-Raphston. 
We found several local maxima and had to experiment different starting 
values until we found a maximum. As mentioned above, achieving con-
vergence was difficult even for the pooled periods. First OLS regressions 
were estimated and the coefficients obtained were used as starting values 
in a second step of estimation, that of an exogenous switching model 
(covariances between wage and switching equations were set to zero). 
Finally, we used the coefficients of the exogenous switching regime as 
starting values for our endogenous switching regime estimation. The 
starting vector for the dependent variable in the switching equation was 
set to zero. The results we are presenting are estimated using the Newton-
Raphston algorithm and the sequences specified above. The number of 
iterations until convergence was 25 (restricted model for the nineties), 
85 (restricted model for the 70’s and 80’s), 96 (unrestricted model for 
the 70’s and 80’s) and 143 (unrestricted model for the 90’s).